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Abstract. YouTube is the leading social media platform for sharing
videos. As a result, it is plagued with misleading content that includes
staged videos presented as real footages from an incident, videos with
misrepresented context and videos where audio/video content is mor-
phed. We tackle the problem of detecting such misleading videos as a
supervised classification task. We develop UCNet - a deep network to
detect fake videos and perform our experiments on two datasets - VAVD
created by us and publicly available FVC [8]. We achieve a macro aver-
aged F-score of 0.82 while training and testing on a 70:30 split of FVC,
while the baseline model scores 0.36. We find that the proposed model
generalizes well when trained on one dataset and tested on the other.
1 Introduction
The growing popularity of YouTube and associated economic opportunities for
content providers has triggered the creation and promotion of fake videos and
spam campaigns on this platform. There are various dimensions to this act in-
cluding creating videos for political propaganda as well as choosing clickbaity or
shocking title/thumbnails in order to get more views. YouTube itself has classi-
fied spam videos into many different categories including misleading metadata
(metadata includes the title, description, tags, annotations, and thumbnail).
We use the following definition of “fake” videos [7]: 1. Staged videos in which
actors perform scripted actions under direction, published as user generated
content (UGC). 2. Videos in which the context of the depicted events is misrep-
resented (e.g., the claimed video location is wrong). 3. Past videos presented as
UGC from breaking events. 4. Videos of which the visual or audio content has
been altered. 5. Computer-generated Imagery (CGI) posing as real.
Spam detection in social media has been a widely researched topic in the aca-
demic community [11,10]. In [3], the author describes a model to detect spam in
tagging systems. For video sharing platforms, most of the work has concentrated
on finding spam comments [1,9].
Recently, there have been works on creating a dataset of fake videos and com-
putationally detecting fake videos [7,6]. As a result, there is a small but publicly
available dataset of fake videos on YouTube called the Fake Video Corpus (or
FVC) [8]. They had also developed a methodology to classify videos as fake or
real, and reported an F-score of 79% using comment based features. After in-
specting their code, we found out that the reported F-score was for the positive
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(fake) class only. So we reproduced their experiment to find that the macro av-
erage F-score by their method is only 36% since the classifier calls almost all
videos as fake.
Through our experiments, we find that simple features extracted from meta-
data are not helpful in identifying fake videos. Hence we propose to use a deep
neural network on comments for the task and achieve promising results. While
using a 70:30 split of the FVC dataset, we find that our method achieves an
F-score of 0.82 in comparison to a score of 0.36 by the baseline, and 0.73 by the
feature based approach. Further, we also present a new dataset of fake videos
containing 123 fake and 423 real videos called VAVD. To see the robustness of
our approach, we also train UCNet on a balanced subset of VAVD, and test on
FVC dataset, achieving an F-score of 0.76, better than the score obtained by the
feature-based classifier trained on the same dataset. Feature-based classifiers, on
the other hand, do not give robust performance while trained on our dataset,
and tested on FVC.
2 Dataset Preparation
We crawled metadata and comments for more than 100,000 videos uploaded
between September 2013 and October 2016 using YouTube REST data API v3.
The details include video metadata (title, description, likes, dislikes, views etc.),
channel details (subscriber count, views count, video count, featured channels
etc.) and comments (text, likes, upload date, replies etc.).
With around 100K crawled videos and possibly very low percentage of fake
content, manually annotating each and every video and searching for fake videos
was infeasible. Also, random sampling from this set is not guaranteed to capture
sufficient number of fake videos. Therefore, we used certain heuristics to boost
the proportion of fake videos in a small sample to be annotated.
We first removed all the videos with views less than 10,000 (the average
number of views in the crawled set) and with comments less than 120 (the average
number of comments on a video in the crawled set). This was done to have only
popular videos in the annotated dataset. A manual analysis of comments on some
hand-picked spam videos gave us some comments such as “complete bullshit”,
“fake fake fake” etc. Then a search for more videos containing such phrases
was performed on the dataset. Repeating the same process (bootstrapping the
“seed phrases” as well as the set of videos) thrice gave a set of 4,284 potentially
spam videos. A similar method was adopted for clustering tweets belonging to
a particular rumor chain on twitter in [12] with good effect. After this, we used
the ratio of dislike count:like count of the video for further filtering. Sorting the
videos based on the ratio in non-ascending order and taking videos having ratio
greater than 0.3 gave us a final set with 650 videos.
An online annotation task was created where a volunteer was given the link
to a video and was asked to mark it as “spam” or “legitimate”. An option to
mark a video as “not sure” was also provided. 33 separate surveys having 20
videos per survey (one having only 10) were created and were submitted for
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annotation to 20 volunteering participants. This task was repeated for a second
round of annotation with the same set of annotators without repetition. Statis-
tics from the two rounds of annotation can be seen in Table 1. We see that
inter-annotator agreement was not perfect, an issue which has been reported
repeatedly in prior works for annotation tasks in social media [2,5]. The dis-
crepancies in the annotations were then resolved by another graduate student
volunteer and if any ambiguity still persisted in characterizing the video as spam,
the video was marked as “not sure”.
We call this dataset as VAVD (Volunteer Annotated Video Dataset) and
the annotations4 as well as our codes5 are publicly available.
Table 1: Statistics from the two rounds of annotations
(a) Number of videos in different classes
Round1 Round2 Final
Spam 158 130 123
Legitimate 400 422 423
Not Sure 92 98 104
(b) Annotator agreements
Spam Legitimate Not Sure
Spam 70 62 26
Legitimate 54 308 38
Not Sure 6 27 59
FVC dataset: The Fake video corpus (FVC, version 2)6 contains 117 fake
and 110 real video YouTube URLs, alongside annotations and descriptions. The
dataset also contains comments explaining why a video has been marked as
fake/real. Though the dataset contains annotations for 227 videos, many of them
have been removed from YouTube. As a result, we could crawl only 98 fake and 72
real videos. We divide these videos into two disjoint sets, FVC70 (30), containing
70 (30)% of these videos for various experiments.
3 Experiments with simple features
We first tried using simple classifiers like SVMs, decision trees and random forests
on VAVD and test it on FVC, which is the benchmark dataset. We hypothesized
several simple features that might differentiate a fake video from a legitimate
one, as described below:
– has clickbait phrase: This feature is true if the title has a phrase commonly
found in clickbaits. For eg. ‘blow your mind’, ‘here is why’, ‘shocking’, ‘ex-
posed’, ‘caught on cam’. We used 70 such phrases gathered manually.
– ratio violent words: A dictionary of several ‘violent’ words like ‘kill’, ‘assault’,
‘hack’, ‘chop’ was used. The value of this feature is equal to the fraction of
violent words in the title. We hypothesize that violent words generate fear
which leads to more views for the video, hence more used in spams.
4 https://github.com/ucnet01/Annotations UCNet
5 https://github.com/ucnet01/UCNet Implementation
6 https://zenodo.org/record/1147958#.WwBS1nWWbCJ
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– ratio caps: This feature is equal to the ratio of number of words in the title
which are in upper case to the total number of words in the title.
– Tweet Classifier Score - Title: The Image verification corpus (IVC)7 is a
dataset containing tweets with fake/real images. We trained a multi-layer
perceptron on IVC to predict the probability of a tweet (i.e., the accompany-
ing image) being fake using only simple linguistic features on the tweet text.
Now, we use the same trained network and feed it the title of a video as input.
The probability of fakeness that it outputs is then taken as a feature,.
– dislike like ratio: Ratio of number of dislikes to number of likes on the video.
– comments fakeness: This is equal to the ratio of comments on the video which
mention that the video is fake. To categorize if a comment says that the video
is fake or not, we detect presence of words and regexes like ‘fa+ke+’, ‘hoax’,
‘photoshopped’, ‘clickbait’, ‘bullshit’, ‘fakest’, ‘bs’.
– comments inappropriateness: This feature is equal to the ratio of number of
comments with swear words to the total number of comments on the video.
– comments conversation ratio: This is the ratio of comments with at least one
reply to the total number of comments on the video.
Since some of these classifiers are sensitive to correlations in the features, we first
decided to remove the lesser important feature among each pair of correlated
features. For this, we calculated correlations among the features on all the 100K
videos and identified the pair of features with a correlation of more than 0.2.
Then we generated feature importance scores using the standard random forests
feature selection method and eliminated the lesser important feature from each
pair. We trained our classifiers using only these remaining features. Table 2 shows
the performance of some of these classifiers when trained on VAVD and tested
on FVC30, as well as when trained on FVC70 and tested on FVC30 with Macro
Averaged Precision (P), Recall (R) and F1 Score (F) as the metrics.
Table 2: Performance of simple classifiers tested on FVC30
(a) training dataset: VAVD
Classifier P R F
SVM- RBF 0.74 0.60 0.49
Random Forests 0.73 0.58 0.46
Logistic Regression 0.54 0.53 0.45
Decision Tree 0.53 0.52 0.46
(b) training dataset: FVC70
Classifier P R F
SVM- RBF 0.56 0.55 0.54
Random Forests 0.74 0.73 0.73
Logistic Regression 0.53 0.53 0.53
Decision Tree 0.73 0.67 0.67
We see that although Random Forests classifier performs the best when
trained and tested on FVC, its performance is very bad when trained on VAVD.
To understand the reason for such poor performance of these classifiers, we
plotted the PCA of the features on FVC dataset, which is shown in Figure
1 (left). Through the PCA, we can see that though the features may help in
identifying some fake videos (the ones on the far right in the plot), for most of
the videos, they fail to discriminate between the two classes.
4 UCNet : Deep learning Approach
Our analysis during dataset preparation reveals that comments may be strong
indicator of fakeness. However, not all comments may be relevant. Hence, we
7 https://github.com/MKLab-ITI/image-verification-corpus/tree/master/mediaeval2016
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computed “fakeness vector” for each comment, a binary vector with each ele-
ment corresponding to the presence or absence of a fakeness indicator phrase
(e.g., “looks almost real”). We used 30 such fakeness indicating phrases. Now,
for each comment, we passed the GoogleNews pre-trained word2vec [4] embed-
dings of words of the comment sequentially to the LSTM. The 300-dimensional
output of the LSTM is hence referred as “comment embedding”. We also took
the fakeness vector and passed it through a dense layer with sigmoid activation
function, to get a scalar between 0 to 1 for the comment called as the “weight”
of the comment. The idea here was that the network would learn the relative
importance of the phrases to finally give the weight of the comment. We then
multiplied the 300-dimensional comment embeddings with the scalar weight of
the comment to get “weighted comment embedding”. Now we took the average
of all these weighted comment embeddings to get one 300-dimensional vector
representing all the comments on the video called the “unified comments em-
bedding”. The unified comments embedding was then concatenated with simple
features described before and passed through 2 dense layers, first with ReLU
activation and 4-dimensional output and the second with softmax to get a 2 di-
mensional output representing the probability of the video being real and fake,
respectively. This network is called UCNet (Unified Comments Net)8 and is
trained using adam’s optimizer with learning rate 10−4 and cross entropy as the
loss function.
Training the network on VAVD and testing on whole FVC gives an F-score of
0.74 on both classes as shown in Table 3. Training and testing UCNet on FVC70
and FVC30 respectively gives a macro F-score of 0.82. We also reproduced the
experiments that [7,6] did and found their Macro average F-score to be 0.36 on
both 10-fold cross validation and on the 70:30 split.
Table 3: Performance of UCNet tested on FVC30
(a) training dataset: VAVD
Class P R F #Videos
Real 0.64 0.88 0.74 72
Fake 0.88 0.64 0.74 98
Macro avg 0.76 0.76 0.74 170
(b) training dataset: FVC70
Class P R F #Videos
Real 0.74 0.87 0.8 23
fake 0.89 0.77 0.83 31
Macro avg 0.82 0.82 0.82 54
To visualize the discriminating power of comments, we trained UCNet on
VAVD. Then we gave each video of FVC as input to the network and extracted
the unified comment embedding. Now we performed PCA of these unified com-
ment embeddings to 2 dimensions and plotted it in Figure 1 (right). We observe
that comment embeddings can discriminate among the two classes very well as
compared to simple features (compare the left and right sub-figures).
Since VAVD had certain properties that overlap with our features (e.g., many
fakeness indicating phrases were picked from videos in this dataset), we decided
not to test our methods on VAVD as it might not be fair. Hence, we have used
it only as a training corpus, and tested on an unseen FVC dataset. Although,
future works may use VAVD as a benchmark dataset as well.
8 https://bit.ly/2rZ7cAT
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Finally, we present Table 4 comparing performance of different classifiers
when tested on FVC30. Random forests has been reported in the table since it
was the best performing simple classifier on the test set. We can see that even
if trained on (a balanced subset of) VAVD, UCNet performs better than any
simple classifier or the baseline.
Table 4: Overall performance comparison of classifiers on FVC30 test set
Classifier Training Set Precision Recall F-Score
UCNet FVC70 0.82 0.82 0.82
UCNet
class balanced
subset of VAVD
0.76 0.76 0.76
Random Forests FVC70 0.74 0.73 0.73
Baseline FVC70 0.29 0.5 0.37
Fig. 1: PCA plots. Red dots are Fake Videos while blue dots are Real Videos
from FVC.
(a) Simple Features (b) Unified Comment Embeddings
5 Conclusions
Our work presents VAVD, a new dataset for research on fake videos, and also
presents UCNet , a deep learning based approach to identify fake videos with high
accuracy using user comments. Future work will involve putting more emphasis
on content and metadata than the comments, to be able to detect latest or
‘breaking news’ spam videos.
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